The Middle East Channel

Sharia courts of the Sinai

In the Sinai Peninsula, where government buildings and checkpoints have been bombarded by rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and car bombs on a near-daily basis in recent weeks, the Egyptian state is losing ground to ultraconservative Islamists with an alternative vision for rule of law. The growing influence of self-taught sharia judges who uphold the Quran over Egyptian law reflects an alarming erosion of state sovereignty in the Sinai Peninsula. In late August, state courts in North Sinai were forced to transfer all of their cases to the comparatively stable jurisdiction of Ismailiya, in the face of escalating attacks by armed extremists targeting government buildings and security personnel. This week, two prominent sharia judges were among 15 hard-line Salafis arrested on charges of inciting terrorist attacks, as the Egyptian government struggles to contain rising extremism. But despite the current crackdown, it is clear that the deeply entrenched sharia courts of North Sinai are here to stay.

Since the removal of former President Mohamed Morsi on July 3, the already fragile government in Sinai has been further crippled by a wave of armed attacks, ambushes, and car bombings by militants equipped with increasingly sophisticated weaponry stolen from police stations or smuggled across Egypt's borders with Libya and Sudan. The escalation of violence has forced the closure of a critical police station in Arish and the evacuation of other government buildings, creating an institutional vacuum that sharia courts are opportunistically exploiting.

The outsourcing of traditional law enforcement functions to non-state actors is reminiscent of a pattern seen in failed states like Somalia, where powerful Islamic courts with their own private militias and ties to al Qaeda seized control over vast swaths of the country in 2006. While the sharia courts of Sinai are nowhere near as institutionalized as those in Somalia, they similarly aspire to absorb the functions of state institutions that are failing to govern.

In an unofficial sharia court in the Egyptian governorate of North Sinai, Sheikh Abu Faisal is slowly building the infrastructure of a parallel Islamic state in plain view of a government he regards as illegal and undemocratic. A former agricultural engineer who taught himself sharia jurisprudence in the jail cell where he was detained on charges of involvement in the 2004 bombings at tourist resorts in Sharm al-Sheikh, Abu Faisal has since become one of the most powerful sharia judges in North Sinai, hearing dozens of cases every week at the House of Sharia Judgment in Arish and another court in Sheikh Zuweid -- among at least 14 informal Islamic courts that have been established since the 2011 revolution.

Informal courts are not new to Sinai, where the predominately Bedouin population has been resolving conflicts through tribal customary law for centuries, but the increasingly Islamic character of non-state judiciaries is a recent innovation. Under Hosni Mubarak's rule, a handful of sharia judges operated underground, holding clandestine hearings in private homes to avoid detection by a state security apparatus that regarded Islamists as a threat to national security and the political status quo. But with the rapid disintegration of state institutions in Sinai since the revolution, sharia has taken on an increasingly public and visible role. Now, the courts occupy brick-and-mortar offices boldly marked with conspicuous signs, and it is clear that they are not just for Islamists anymore. "Everyone is using sharia courts," explained Mahmoud Saeed al-Lotfy, a prominent lawyer who runs a practice in Arish. Among the many mainstream professionals who have turned to sharia courts is a successful telecommunications entrepreneur, Anwar Ahmed Mohamed, who operates the local branch of a Cairo-based internet service provider that was recently accused of over-charging. When a furious mob of customers armed with knives gathered outside of the company's office and threatened to burn it down, Mohamed knew that he could not rely on the government for help, so he turned instead to the fastest and most reputable court in town: the House of Sharia Judgment. 

While the official justice system has abandoned Sinai, sharia courts have never been busier. Abu Faisal explained that a growing number of informal sharia courts in North Sinai are stepping in to enforce order in what would otherwise be a legal void. "We are the law here," he said. The House of Sharia Judgment is the largest Islamic court in North Sinai and claims to be working on hundreds of cases. When I visited its headquarters in Arish, the presiding judge, Sheikh Assad al-Beik, proudly informed me that his daily schedule is booked every day for the next three months, and noted that the court will soon be relocating to a larger building to accommodate growing demand for its services. Beik estimates that in the last three years alone, sharia courts have absorbed 75 percent of the caseload once handled by the official justice system.

While the rise of sharia courts in Sinai has accelerated sharply since the revolution, the trend can be understood as an extension of a longer-term process of tribal Islamization. The process began in the 1980s, under the influence of ultraconservative Salafi ideology imported by Bedouin students returning from the Nile Delta region and particularly Zagazig University, one of the key intellectual strongholds of hardline Islamism. By the 1990s, these newly Islamized Bedouins were actively proselytizing and setting up Salafi charitable organizations in North Sinai.

Residents of Arish, where the elevator in my hotel played a recording of Quranic verses on repeat, say religious conservatism has increased noticeably in recent years and particularly since the 2011 revolution, as the rapid erosion of government institutions created an optimal environment for the expansion of Salafi charitable organizations offering badly needed services that the state has failed to deliver.

The largest of these Salafi organizations, Ahl al-Sunna wal Jama'a (ASJ), has branches all over Egypt including one in Arish, which is headed by Beik. ASJ and the House of Sharia Judgment share adjacent offices in the same building, and together, they are building the infrastructure of a parallel welfare state providing free legal services and security through the mobilization of ASJ's "popular committees" -- unarmed community police units that can be seen patrolling the streets of Arish after sundown. While Beik insists that ASJ's extensive activities are staffed entirely by unpaid volunteers, most Salafi groups in Egypt have benefited from an influx of funding from the Gulf countries, and some of ASJ's work -- like chartering buses and providing supporters with a per diem of L.E. 45 (approximately $6.44) to participate in pro-sharia protests in Cairo last year -- could not be done without significant private financing.

While sharia courts and their Salafi affiliates have flourished in the post-revolutionary security vacuum, Abu Faisal fears that the return of military rule on July 3 has resurrected an authoritarian system that is once again determined to eradicate Islamists from political life. "What we are witnessing is the return of the police state," he told me over tea served on the living room floor of his apartment in downtown Arish, where a television was tuned to Al-Jazeera's live coverage of anti-military demonstrations in Cairo demanding the reinstatement of ousted Morsi. In the months since Morsi's removal, Islamists have capitalized on the dubious legality of the military's intervention to portray the Muslim Brotherhood as the defender of democratic institutions and rule of law.

This narrative emphasizing the unlawful nature of the military's takeover has resonated powerfully in Sinai, where sharia judges are promoting Islamic law as the only remedy for a broken justice system that cannot be trusted to investigate or prosecute state-perpetrated crimes -- a suspicion seemingly confirmed by the recent release of Mubarak from prison on a procedural technicality. After the army moved to forcefully disperse pro-Morsi sit-ins in Cairo on August 14, killing hundreds of Islamists including sons and daughters of top Brotherhood officials, Abu Faisal was so outraged by the interim government's attitude of impunity that he conducted a symbolic trial to hold the perpetrators accountable under Islamic law. The verdict, published on his Facebook page, sentenced General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the interior minister, and other "infidels" to public execution. When Egyptian newspapers described the statement as a "fatwa" condoning the assassination of public officials, Abu Faisal was quick to accuse the media of distorting his views, insisting that his symbolic ruling was purely rhetorical. But at the same time, Abu Faisal acknowledged that rising anger among Islamists in Sinai is contributing to a retaliatory mood. "There is a long line of people seeking revenge," he said in an interview on September 11.

Anti-military sentiment in Sinai has been enflamed by a sweeping counter-terrorism campaign launched in July, which has since been described as the single largest Egyptian military operation since the 1973 October War. Among the Bedouins, the deadly crackdown is reviving painful memories of the Mubarak-era counter-terrorism campaigns in which thousands were incarcerated and allegedly tortured. Statements by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Sinai-based jihadists demanding retaliation for the killing of "martyrs" in recent air strikes indicate that the military's heavy-handed strategy is likely to generate as many new terrorists as it eliminates. A common theme in the rhetoric emanating from militant groups is the justification of violent tactics as legitimate retribution for unlawful state action that the official justice system is unwilling or unable to prosecute. In a recent audio message proclaiming solidarity with Egyptian Islamists, an AQAP leader called the government's violent dispersal of pro-Morsi rallies a "serious crime" and described state security personnel as a "gang" colluding with Israel "in killing our mujahideen brothers in Sinai."

Sharia judges in Sinai now find themselves at a pivotal crossroads between moderation and extremism. The sheikhs I interviewed in August were careful to condemn acts of terrorism and violence by militants, whom Beik described as criminals bringing "fitna" -- or chaos and social upheaval -- to the Sinai. In the absence of a functional security apparatus, sharia judges and other Islamist figures have proven themselves to be the only credible mediators capable of negotiating between the government and militant groups. A prominent Salafi sheikh, Mohamed Adly, helped broker the release of a soldier and six policemen who were kidnapped by extremists in May. Last year, sharia judges backed the formation of a committee, including a number of prominent Salafi leaders and more moderate Islamists affiliated with al-Azhar, to engage in a dialogue with militant groups in Sinai and assess their demands. Ahl al-Sunna wal Gamma -- headed by Beik in Arish -- has also taken a stand against violent extremism, recently condemning an RPG attack that killed several cement workers after militants mistakenly hit a bus instead of their intended target, a police vehicle.

Sharia judges, eager to disassociate themselves from more radical Islamists, are quick to enumerate their moderate credentials and tolerance of religious minorities. Beik insisted that the courts operate on a purely voluntary basis and would never forcibly impose Islamic law on non-Muslims without their consent. To illustrate this point, he proudly informed me that the House of Sharia Judgment has heard three cases involving claims by Christian litigants against Muslim adversaries since the revolution, and in all three cases, the Christian party prevailed -- a fact he cited as evidence of the courts' neutrality.

But although the sharia judges of North Sinai pay lip service to liberal democratic principles of inclusion and equality, they ultimately aspire to establish a parallel state governed not by Egypt's constitution, but by a retrograde interpretation of sharia that relegates women and religious minorities to second-class citizenship. For now, their rulings are purely advisory and non-binding. But Abu Faisal predicts that his court's decisions will one day carry the force of law in the Islamic emirate he hopes to see established in the Sinai. "Sharia is already the law of the land here," he said. "God willing, someday it will be the law of the state."

For the time being, sharia judges are distancing themselves from militant groups and could potentially play a constructive role in mediating between Islamists and government officials. But as the rhetoric on both sides of an intensely polarized battle between Morsi supporters and the military becomes more extreme, prominent Islamists in Sinai are showing sympathy for the violent tactics of radicals. On August 14, a Sinai-based jihadist posted a photo of a church that militants firebombed in retaliation for violence against Morsi supporters in Cairo, and Abu Faisal commented approvingly, "May God prevent it from ever returning." In what has become an existential struggle between two mutually exclusive visions for Egypt's future, even the more moderate Islamists in Sinai who have previously renounced violence are now facing pressure to toughen their stand against the military. As Beik predicted, "There will absolutely be no retreat, no matter how many people are killed."

Mara Revkin @MaraRevkin is a J.D. candidate at Yale Law School and former assistant director of the Atlantic Council's Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East.


The Middle East Channel

Suspected al Qaeda attacks on army targets in southern Yemen kill 40 people

Suspected al Qaeda linked militants launched simultaneous attacks on army targets in southern Yemen Friday killing at least 40 people. An estimated 30 soldiers were killed and many others wounded when two car bombs exploded at a military base in the town of al-Nashama in Shabwa province. In the town of Maifaa, gunmen killed 10 soldiers. While no one has claimed responsibility for the attacks, military officials believe they were carried out by Yemen's al Qaeda affiliate, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Islamist militants have taken advantage of political instability in Yemen since the 2011 uprising against former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, and have carried out numerous attacks against Yemeni security and military officers in the southern provinces. Friday's attacks were among the largest attacks against the Yemeni military and came after a recent statement by authorities warning of an expected increase in al Qaeda attacks and suicide bombings.


After days of fighting in the northern town of Azaz, near the Turkish border, the Free Syrian Army's Northern Storm Brigade and fighters from the al Qaeda affiliate, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) have negotiated a cease-fire. The Islamist Tawheed Brigade, based about 20 miles south in Aleppo, brokered the truce. The deal included the installation of a checkpoint between the two sides and an agreement that future disputes would be taken before an Islamic council. As the groups negotiated the cease-fire, Syria's main Western-backed opposition group, the Syrian National Coalition, issued a statement criticizing the al Qaeda linked militants saying they are undermining the rebels' struggle for a free Syria. In an interview with the Guardian, Syria's Deputy Prime Minister Qadri Jamil said that the Syrian war had reached a stalemate, with neither side strong enough to win. Additionally, he said that the Syrian government would call for a cease-fire after a long-delayed peace conference in Geneva. However, Jamil insists that he was misquoted. Meanwhile, the United States is pushing for a U.N. resolution on Syria ahead of Saturday's deadline for the Assad regime to provide a list of its chemical weapons facilities.


  • Two bombs hidden inside air conditioning units at a Sunni mosque south of the Iraqi city of Samarra killed an estimated 15 people when they exploded during Friday prayers.
  • The U.S. administration has hinted at a possible meeting between President Obama and Iranian President Rouhani as a top Iranian advisor said Iran's leaders are willing to negotiate in order to end sanctions. 

Arguments and Analysis

'Why Iran seeks constructive engagement' (Hassan Rouhani, The Washington Post)

"I am committed to confronting our common challenges via a two-pronged approach.

First, we must join hands to constructively work toward national dialogue, whether in Syria or Bahrain. We must create an atmosphere where peoples of the region can decide their own fates. As part of this, I announce my government's readiness to help facilitate dialogue between the Syrian government and the opposition.

Second, we must address the broader, overarching injustices and rivalries that fuel violence and tensions. A key aspect of my commitment to constructive interaction entails a sincere effort to engage with neighbors and other nations to identify and secure win-win solutions.

We and our international counterparts have spent a lot of time -- perhaps too much time -- discussing what we don't want rather than what we do want. This is not unique to Iran's international relations. In a climate where much of foreign policy is a direct function of domestic politics, focusing on what one doesn't want is an easy way out of difficult conundrums for many world leaders. Expressing what one does want requires more courage."

'Diplomacy may make Bashar disposable' (Michael Young, The Daily Star)

"Within a week, one story -- punishing Bashar Assad for his probable use of chemical weapons against civilians in the Ghouta region -- has been pushed aside by another: the possibility of a rapprochement between Iran and the United States, even as Washington is coordinating its policies toward Syria with another adversary, Russia.

It's best in these cases not to get carried away by optimism. Diplomacy and dialogue are not ends in themselves. Yet the potential opportunities are great, whether for Syria or the rest of the Middle East, if broader understandings can be reached between the main regional and global actors. And tectonic shifts, if they occur, may ultimately ensure that Assad is politically disposable.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has made normalization with the West a central plank of his political program. Critically, he seems to have the support of the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. On Tuesday, Khamenei endorsed Rouhani's position, saying Iran should embrace diplomacy over militarism and that it was time for ‘heroic leniency.'

In remarks to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, Khamenei said, ‘[I]t is not necessary for the IRGC to be active in the political field, but defending the revolution requires that they understand political realities.' This appeared to be Khamenei's way of legitimizing Rouhani's opening in front of an institution that, potentially, may pose problems for the president down the road."

'Yemen: Corruption, Capital Flight and Global Drivers of Conflict' (Ginny Hill, Peter Salisbury, Léonie Northedge and Jane Kinninmont, Chatham House)

"Before the 2011 uprising, Yemen was better known as the target of two distinct -- and sometimes conflicting -- Western narrative frameworks for foreign policy. For more than a decade, it has been classified as a front-line state in the US-led 'war on terror', with Western and regional governments providing military aid to an increasingly sclerotic regime aligned with their counter-terrorism objectives. It is also routinely cited as a 'fragile state'. Western (as well as Arab) aid efforts to alleviate poverty and hunger are designed partly to mitigate the risk of an eventual full-scale state collapse. But as the report argues, policies which effectively helped to sustain the Saleh regime may well have hastened the arrival of such a collapse. Moreover, following more than three decades as a military republic dominated by an authoritarian leader, Yemen also belongs to the broader regional narrative of the ‘Arab Spring' that accompanied the downfall of Tunisia's President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak and Libya's leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in 2011."

--Mary Casey & Joshua Haber