The Middle East Channel

The Egyptian liberals' soft defeat

On Saturday, Egyptians voted in a national referendum on the country's new constitution, drafted over the course of six months by a largely Islamist-dominated Constituent Assembly. Opponents of the new document say it restricts freedoms, inflates the powers of the presidency, and makes second-class citizens out of Egypt's Coptic Christian minority. Mohamed ElBaradei, leader of the National Salvation Front (NSF), a loose coalition of opposition figures, including former presidential candidates Hamdeen Sabahi and Amr Moussa, declared that the constitution did not represent a majority of Egyptians, and urged his followers (after some dithering about a boycott) to vote no.

One could be forgiven for thinking that the results of the first phase of the referendum (conducted in 10 of Egypt's most populous governorates, with the remaining 17 to vote on December 22) were a blow to ElBaradei's narrative. The new constitution passed comfortably, with an estimated 57 percent voting yes. The Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) has "hailed" the poll, describing the result as a rebuke to "politicians and collaborators who ignored the will of the people."

On the face of it, the Brotherhood's narrative seems sound. In fact, a greater share of voters in each governorate voted for President Mohamed Morsi's constitution than had voted for the man himself last June (see figure). In fact, only in Cairo and Alexandria did Morsi's constitution do more poorly than Morsi had, and even then only barely. This result has been interpreted by some as a strengthening of Morsi's mandate, and a repudiation of the notion that the president's controversial actions over the past few weeks have lost him the goodwill of many of the Egyptians who supported him.

But this is misleading. Though Gamal Heshmat (the former parliamentarian from Damanhour and a senior FJP figure) declared that the "long queues" at polling stations indicated "heavy turnout," the reality was precisely the opposite. Turnout was slightly over 30 percent, much lower than the 52 percent turnout in the June presidential runoff, or the 43 percent turnout in the presidential election's first round, or even the 40 percent turnout in the March 2011 constitutional referendum (a waste of time in which Egyptians voted to amend a constitution that the military then went ahead and abolished). The chart below compares turnout by governorate in the referendum to the presidential election. If turnout were the same, the dots would all appear on the dashed line. If referendum turnout were higher than presidential election turnout, the dots would all appear above the dashed line. As you can see, they're all comfortably below it -- an arresting visual representation of how many Egyptians seem to have checked out of the political process in the last six months.

In fact, a better way of gauging whether the Muslim Brotherhood and Morsi picked up steam or lost it during this referendum would be to compare how many raw votes Morsi got in June versus how many raw votes his constitution got on Saturday. The chart below shows that, in every governorate except South Sinai, North Sinai, and Aswan (where roughly the same number of people came out for both Morsi and his charter), fewer people cast ballots for Morsi's constitution than they had for him. In other words, some who voted for the president six months ago decided not to do so on Saturday. Whether those former supporters stayed home or defected to the other side is hard to know, but this result cannot be spun as a victory for the president.  

But what does this mean for the opposition? How can it capitalize on the president's newly-demonstrated vulnerability?

One suggestion that emerges from the data is that the opposition should reach out to supporters of former presidential candidate Ahmed Shafiq. If we assume that all of the "yes" votes were cast by people who had voted for the president in June, and all of the "no" votes cast by people who had voted against him, the results of the referendum suggest that more Shafiq voters than Morsi voters stayed home this time. Of course, this assumption is likely not 100 percent true in the real world --some Shafiq voters certainly voted "yes," while some Morsi voters said "no," but if you believe it's a fair assumption in general, the results are striking. The chart below plots the estimated number of Shafiq voters in each governorate who failed to vote "no" against the estimated number of Morsi voters who failed to vote "yes." In every governorate save Alexandria, the anti-Morsi side lost more votes between June and today than the pro-Morsi side did. What this suggests is that there is a large bank of voters, alienated from the political process, and proven in its opposition to the president, just waiting to be tapped.

The referendum isn't over, and a surprise in the second round is possible (but not likely). If current patterns persist, Morsi's constitution is going to pass, and Egypt's liberals are going to need to begin preparing for the inevitable parliamentary elections. And to win in those contests, they are going to have to figure out a way to overcome their distaste at canvassing for the votes of erstwhile supporters of Shafiq (and, by extension, Mubarak).

This will be a bitter pill to swallow. After all, Egypt's liberals did not overthrow Mubarak merely to have to scramble after the votes of his orphans. But as the results of this referendum suggest, the greatest beneficiary of the political marginalization of the fulul is Mohamed Morsi.

Tarek Masoud is an associate professor of public policy at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government.


The Middle East Channel

Rethinking the Muslim Brotherhood

What happened to Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood? Variants of this question have consumed the international media, academics, and policymaking circles over the last few weeks. Many Egyptians have equally given voice to unprecedented rage against the MB during the crisis sparked by President Mohamed Morsi's moves to push through a controversial new constitution. Bloody clashes between the MB followers and protesters in front of the presidential palace and the provocative discourse of some of the MB leaders took many by surprise, as did the outrageous actions of the MB and what is said to be torture chambers that were allegedly run by some of the MB members against peaceful protesters who were beaten and terrified at Morsi's presidential palace.

The Brotherhood's behavior seems bewildering to many observers who have followed the organization for many years. The recent crisis seems a profound setback and a retreat from its "moderate" character and longstanding "reformist" agenda. Some Egyptian politicians now accuse the MB of adopting a "fascist" propensity in dealing with its opponents. Many western commentators go farther, using the crisis as an excuse to cast profound doubts on the MB ideology and to question its democratic credentials. What does this crisis really say about the "nature" and the true "color" of the MB? Has it changed its ideology after taking power, or revealed its reformist rhetoric as a lie?

As someone who has been studying the Muslim Brotherhood intensely for decades, I would argue that any attempt to fathom the MB behavior should take into account two key points: the impact of ideology on behavior and the role of internal dynamics in shaping the MB strategy and decisions.

First, despite its importance, it is problematic to assume that the MB's ideology directly shapes its actions and behavior. Ideology can inform behavior, but political reality forges and guides it. The MB has a significantly loose and broad ideology that fits with different contexts and circumstances. Indeed, the vagueness and elastic character of the MB ideology enabled it to last for more than eight decades without significant schism or fissures. Historically, the pragmatism of the MB, in many instances, superseded its ideology. Moreover, the MB took power in Egypt not primarily because of its ideology but mainly because its unrivaled organizational and moblizational capabilities. The chief role of ideology in the MB is mainly to recruit new members and foster their commitment and loyalty to the movement.

The MB has always calculated its moves and decisions based on interests rather than its ideological or ontological views. Therefore, it is highly misleading to contend that the MB ideology was behind the recent events. Likewise, it would be imprecise to argue that the MB has changed its ideology after taking power. In fact, it is quiet the opposite. The inability of the MB to modify its ideology to adapt with the new environment in Egypt after the revolution has created many problems and distorted its image. This is in part because ideologies don't change overnight. They take years, if not decades, to be internalized within a movement's structure and embraced by its members and leadership.  

The crucial question then becomes: if the MB wasn't changed and its ideology doesn't shape its behavior, how could we construe the recent actions and attitude of the MB? One short way to answer this question is to reconsider the functionality in an open and fluid context. The MB has struggled to reconcile its internalized ideology with Egypt's rapidly changing political reality. The MB was created and operated for decades as an "opposition" movement. Over decades, it developed a tradition of how to "protest" not how to "rule." After the revolution, the movement couldn't make the required shift from an opposition movement to a ruling party. In other words, the MB is still unable to restructure itself as a normal political party instead of a semi-clandestine movement with vexing and multi-faceted agenda.

The bewildering behavior of the MB reflects the complexity of its internal structure and dynamics. And here we come to the second point. By internal dynamics I mean two things: the internal coherence and balance of power within the MB. For decades, preserving the MB's survival and unity was a key objective to the movement's leadership. The indoctrination and socialization process within the MB is deliberately designed to serve this goal above all else. However, maintaining the integration of the MB came at the expense of modernizing the movement's organizational structure to become more democratic and transparent. The decision-making process within the MB is strict and exclusionary, and the line of leadership doesn't allow real participation from the lower levels particularly in the strategic decisions. The organizational norms of allegiance (bay‘a), obedience (ta'ah), commitment (iltizam), etc. enable leaders to act on behalf of all members without real accountability or checks on their power. Despite the new environment, these norms still operate and manifest in the MB's behavior and decisions. Thus, when the leadership calls for protest or marches, members do nothing but obey their leaders -- or else, as with a number of youth leaders, leave the organization.

Former President Hosni Mubarak's repression interacted with the internal dynamics of the MB to shape this organizational ideology. It entrenched the sense of victimhood among members and created a subculture of ordeal and tribulation (mihna) that bound members and dominated them over the past three decades. However, after the downfall of Mubarak and the extraordinary political openness, the MB's leadership couldn't (and may be doesn't want to) develop a different subculture or mechanisms that could maintain members' unity and loyalty in a more participatory and inclusive manner. It was the "external" threat or enemy that preserved the integration of the MB and continues to ensure member commitment. Therefore, when President Morsi and Mohamed Badie, the Supreme Guide of the MB, or any other senior leaders talk of "conspiracy," plot, or "hidden hands" that "seek to subvert the revolution," their eyes are on their followers not opponents. It is the language that resonates with the hearts and minds of Ikhwan. In other words, the MB's embedded anxiety about unity and coherence makes it hard for members to act as normal political actors.

The other internal element is the balance of power within the MB. The MB organization is currently under the control of conservatives. Since the end of the 1990s onwards, the conservative leaders managed to solidify their grip on power within the MB. After two decades of a relatively balanced relationship between the so-called reformists and the conservatives, the latter became more powerful and were able to dominate the MB organization and decision-making process. This was the case until the 2011 uprising, when the entire organization came under the control of the conservatives. The conservatives, led by Khariat El-Shater, Deputy of the Supreme Guide, Mahmoud Ezzat, the former Secretary General of the MB from 2001-2010 who was promoted to Deputy of the Supreme Guide two years ago, and Mahmoud Ghozlan, the Spokesperson of the MB and member of the Guidance Bureau as well as Shater's brother-in-law, were able to alienate the reformists and expel them from the movement. They restructured the influential bodies of the MB, the Guidance Bureau and the Shura Council, to become more obedient and loyal to them. Not surprisingly, after the revolution, the reformist current within the MB faded away. Prominent figures like Abdel Moniem Aboul Fotouh, Mohamed Habib, the former Deputy of the Supreme Guide, Ibrahim El-Za'farani, Khaled Dau'd, and Hitham Abu Khalil, were excluded and had to leave the MB. Even the young reformists who took part in the uprising from the outset, such as Islam Lotfi and Mohamed El-Qassas, were unashamedly expelled and left the movement.

Furthermore, the domination of the conservatives on the MB became more visible when Shater and then Morsi were selected to run for the presidency. While the former is a heavyweight leader within the MB due to his financial and organizational capabilities, the latter was an utter example of how conservatives "craft" their loyal cadres and leaders within the MB. As I explained elsewhere, Morsi was selected for the presidency not due to his political skills (indeed he lacks a lot of them) but mainly because of his commitment and loyalty to the conservative leadership. His record of trust, obedience, and commitment over the past two decades made him an ideal candidate for the job. Therefore, when Morsi speaks, acts, or behaves, he reflects the conservative face of the MB. Since he took power, Morsi became the mouthpiece of the conservatives who have captured the MB over the past two decades. For them, he is their man in the presidential palace and his throne should be protected at any cost.

Over the past two years, the MB has been preoccupied with taking power at the expense of restructuring and modernizing its ideology and organization which has led to its current baffling and confusing behavior. It has so far won power, however, at the expense of its image and credibility.

Khalil al-Anani is a Scholar of Middle Eastern Studies at the School of Government and International Relations at Durham University and former visiting fellow at the Brookings Institute in Washington, D.C. He can be reached at: On Twitter: @Khalilalanani.