The Middle East Channel

A new Arab street in post-Islamist times

The popular uprising in Tunisia has surprised many -- Western observers, the Arab elites, and even those who have generated this remarkable episode. The surprise seems justified. How could one imagine that a campaign of ordinary Tunisians in just over one month would topple a dictator who presided over a police state for 23 years? This is a region where the life expectancy of 'presidencies' match only the 'eternal' rule of its sheiks, kings, and ayatollahs who bank on oil and political rent (Western protection) to hang onto their power and subjugate their people. But the wonder about the Jasmine Revolution -- and the subsequent mass protests in Algeria, Yemen, Jordan, and more spectacularly in Egypt's numerous cities on Jan. 25, 2011 -- also comes from a common mistrust among the Arab elites and their outside allies about the so called ‘Arab street' -- one that is simultaneously feared and pitied for its 'dangerous irrationality' and 'deplorable apathy.'

But history gives us a more complex picture. Neither ‘irrational' and prone to riots nor 'apathetic' and 'dead,' the Arab street conveys collective sentiments and dissent expressed by diverse constituencies who possess few or no effective institutional channels to express discontent. The result is a street politics where Arabs nonetheless find ways to express their views and interests. Today the Arab street is shifting. With new players and means of communication, it may usher some far reaching changes in the region's politics.

There is a long history of such "street" politics in the Arab world. Popular movements arose to oppose colonial domination as in Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon during the late 1950s after Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. The unsuccessful tripartite aggression by Britain, France, and Israel in October 1956 to reclaim control of the canal caused an outpouring of popular protests in Arab countries in support of Egypt. The turbulent years following 1956 were probably the last for a major pan-Arab solidarity movement until the pro-Palestinian wave of 2002. But social protests by workers, artisans, women and students for domestic social development, citizens' rights and political participation continued even as the Arab state grew more repressive. The 1980s saw waves of wildcat strikes and street protests in Morocco, Sudan, Lebanon, Tunisia, Jordan and Egypt protesting cutbacks in consumer commodity subsidies, price rises, pay cuts and layoffs -- developments largely associated with the IMF-recommended structural adjustment programs. In the meantime, the bulging student population continued to play a key role in the popular movements either along the secular-nationalist and leftist forces or more recently under the banner of Islamism.

The first Palestinian intifada (1987 to 1993), one of the most grassroots-based mobilizations in the Middle East during the past century, combined demand for self-rule with democratic governance and the reclaiming of individual and national dignity. Triggered by a fatal accident caused by an Israeli truck driver, and against the backdrop of years of occupation, the uprising included almost all of the Palestinian population, in particular women and children, who resorted to non-violent methods of resistance to the occupation, such as civil disobedience, strikes, demonstrations, withholding taxes, and product boycotts. Led mainly by the local (vis exiled) leaders, the movement built on popular committees (e.g., women's, voluntary work, and medical relief) to sustain itself, while serving as the embryonic institutions of a future independent Palestinian state. That intifada remains a role model and inspiration to today's protesters.

The late 1990s and 2000s produced the next great wave of Arab street politics, a wave that continues today. Arab street politics assumed a distinctively pan-Arab expanse in response to Israel's incursions into the Palestinian West Bank and Gaza, and the Anglo-U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. For a short while, the Arab states seemed to lose their tight control,and publicly vocal opposition groups proliferated, even among the"Westernized" and "apolitical" segments of the population. Millions marched in dozens of Arab cities to protest what they considered the U.S.-Israeli domination of the region. These campaigns that were directed against outside forces sometimes enjoyed the tacit approval of the Arab states, as a way of redirecting popular dissent against their own repressive governments. For a long while, Arab states managed to neutralize the political class by promulgating a common discourse based on nativism, religiosity, and anti-Zionism, while severely restricting effective opposition against their own regimes.

Things, however, appear to be changing. There are now signs of a new Arab street with post-nationalist, post-Islamist visions and novel forms of mobilization. The 2004 democracy movement in Egypt -- with the Kefayaat the core -- mobilized thousands of middle class professionals, students,teachers, judges, and journalists who called for an end to Emergency Law, release of political prisoners, end to torture, and end to Hosni Mubarak's presidency. Building directly on the activities of the Popular Committee for Solidarity with the Palestinian Intifada, this movement chose to work with ‘popular forces' rather than traditional opposition parties, bringing the campaign into the streets instead of broadcasting it from headquarters, and focused on domestic issues rather than simply international demands.

More recently, the ‘Cedar Revolution,' a grassroots movement of some 1.5 million Lebanese from all walks of life demanding a meaningful sovereignty, democracy, and an end to foreign meddling, resulted in the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon in 2005. The Iranian Green wave, a pervasive democracy movement that emerged following the 2009 fraudulent presidential elections, has served as a prelude to what are now the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia and the current uprising in the streets of Egypt. These are all breaks from traditional Arab politics in that they project a new post-Islamist and post-ideological struggle that combine the concerns for national dignity with social justice and democracy. These movements are pluralistic in constituencies, pursue new ways of mobilizing (such as boycott campaigns, cyber-activities and protest art) and are weary of the traditional party politics.

Why this change? Certainly there is the long-building youth bulge and thes pread of new information technology (Internet, e-mail, Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and especially satellite TV like Al Jazeera). Frustrated youth are now rapidly moving to exploit these new resources to assert themselves and to mobilize. For instance, Egyptian youth used Facebook to mobilize some 70,000 mostly educated youth who made calls for free speech, economic welfare, and the elimination of corruption. Activists succeeded in organizing street protests, rallies and more spectacularly initiating a general strike on April 6, 2008 to support the striking textile workers. The January 25 mass demonstration in Egypt was primarily organized through Facebook and Twitter. These modes and technologies of mobilization seem to play a crucial role in the Tunisian uprising.

But there is more happening here than only information technology. The social structure throughout the region is changing rapidly. There is an explosion of mass educational institutions which produce higher levels of literacy and education, thus enhancing the class of educated populace. At the same time, these societies are rapidly becoming urban. By far more people live in the cities than in rural areas (just below Central and Eastern Europe). A creeping urbanity is permeating into the traditional rural societies-- there are modern divisions of labor, modern schools, expanding serviceworks, electrification, and especially a modern communications system (phone lines, cars, roads, and minibuses) which generate time-space compression between the ‘urban' and ‘urban' worlds. The boundary between ‘urban' and ‘rural' is becoming increasingly blurred and ‘rural' populations are no longer rural in the traditional sense.

But a key change is the emergence of a ‘middle-class poor' (with significant political implications) at the expense of the decline of the more traditional classes and their movements -- notably, peasant organizations, cooperative movements and trade unions. As peasants have moved to the city from the countryside, or lost their land to become rural day laborers, the social basis of peasant and cooperative movements has eroded. The weakening of economic populism, closely linked to structural adjustment, has led to the decline of public-sector employment, which constituted the core of trade unionism. Through reform, downsizing, privatization and relocation, structural adjustment has undermined the unionized public sector, while new private enterprises linked to international capital remain largely union-free. Although the state bureaucracy remains weighty, its underpaid employees are unorganized, and a large proportion of them survive by taking second or third jobs in the informal sector. Currently, much of the Arab work force is self-employed. Many wage-earners work in small enterprises where paternalistic relations prevail. On average, between one third and one half of the urban work force are involved in the unregulated, unorganized informal sector. Lacking institutional channels to make their claims, streets become the arena for the expression of discontent.

And all these are happening against the background of expanding educational institutions, especially the universities that produce hundreds of thousands of graduates each year. They graduate with new status, information, and expectations. Many of them are the children of comfortable parents or the traditional rural or urban poor. But this new generation is different from their parents in outlook, exposure, social standing, and expectations. Unlike the post-colonial socialist and statist modernization era that elevated college graduates as the builders of the new nation, the current neoliberal turn has failed to offer most of them an economic status that could match their heightened claims and global dreams. They constitute the paradoxical class of ‘middle-class poor' with high education, self-constructed status, wider worldviews, and global dreams who nonetheless are compelled -- by unemployment and poverty -- to subsist on the margins of neoliberal economy as casual, low-paid, low-status, and low-skilled workers (as street vendors, sales persons, boss boys, or taxi drivers), and to reside in the overcrowded slums and squatter settlements of the Arab cities. Economically poor, they still fantasize about an economic status that their expectations demand -- working in IT companies, with secure jobs, middle-class consumption patterns, and perhaps migration to the West.

The ‘middle-class poor' are the new proletariat of the Middle East, who are very different from their earlier counterpart -- in their college education, knowledge of the world, expectations that others have of them, and with a strong awareness of their own deprivation. Muhammad Bouazizi, the street vendor who ignited himself and a revolution in Tunisia represented this ‘middle=class poor.' The politics that this class pursued in the 1980s and 1990s was expressed in Islamism as the most formidable opposition to the secular undemocratic regimes in the region. But Islamism itself has faced a crisis in recent years, not least because it is seriously short of democracy. With the advent of post-Islamist conditions in the Muslim Middle East, the ‘middle- class poor' seems to pursue a different, post-Islamist, trajectory.

Will the Tunisian uprising unleash democratic revolution in the Arab world? The events in Tunisia have already caused mass jubilations among the people and a profound anxiety among the power elites in the region. Mass protests have broken out in Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, and Yemen, while leaders are inquandary as to how to react. The possibility of similar trajectories in the region depends primarily on how the incumbent regimes will behave. The grim reality is that precisely because a democratic revolution has occurred in Tunisia, it might not happen elsewhere at least in the short run. This paradox reminds one of the Bolshevik Revolution's loneliness in Europe, and the Islamic Revolution in the Middle East. Those revolutions did inspire similar movements around the world, but they also made the incumbent states more vigilant not to allow (by reform or repression, or both) similar outcomes to unfold in their backyards.

Yet in the longer term their efforts may not be enough. The structural changes (educational development, public role of women, urban expansion, new media and information venues, next to deep inequalities and corruption) are likely to make these developmentalist authoritarian regimes -- whether Libya, Saudi Arabia, Iran, or Egypt -- more vulnerable. If dissent is controlled by rent-subsidized welfare handouts, any economic downturn and weakening of provisions is likely to spark popular outrage.

At stake is not just jobs and decent material welfare; at stake is also people's dignity and pursuit of human and democratic rights. As we have seen so powerfully in Tunisia, the translation of collective dissent into collective action and sustained campaign for change has its own intriguing and often unpredictable dynamics. This explains why we keep getting surprised in this part of the world -- revolutions happen where we do not expect, and they do not happen where we do. After all, who sensed the scent of jasmine in the backstreets of Tunisia just a few weeks ago?

Asef Bayat is professor of Sociology and Middle East Studies at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. He is co-author of  Being Young and Muslim" and author of "Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East."

AFP/Getty Images

Marc Lynch

Will the Arab revolutions spread?

The end of the Tunisian story hasn't yet been written. We don't yet know whether the so-called Jasmine Revolution will produce fundamental change or a return to a cosmetically-modified status quo ante, democracy or a newly configured authoritarianism. But most of the policy community has long since moved on to ask whether the Tunisian protests will spread to other Arab countries -- Egypt, of course, but also Jordan, Yemen, Algeria, Libya, and almost every place else. Most experts on each individual country can offer powerful, well-reasoned explanations as to why their country won't be next. I'm skeptical too.

But I found it unsatisfying to settle for such skepticism as I watched the massive demonstrations unfold in Egypt on my Twitter feed while moderating a panel discussion on Tunisia yesterday (I plead guilty). As I've been arguing for the last month, something does seem to be happening at a regional level, exposing the crumbling foundations of Arab authoritarianism and empowering young populations who suddenly believe that change is possible. There are strong reasons to expect most of these regimes to survive, which we shouldn't ignore in a moment of enthusiasm. But we also shouldn't ignore this unmistakable new energy, the revelation of the crumbling foundations of Arab authoritarian regimes, or the continuing surprises which should keep all analysts humble about what might follow.

The arguments for skepticism are strong ones. Without belaboring the obvious, every Arab country is different. Each has a distinct political history and culture, a distinct political economy, a distinct demographic profile and urban geography. Many compelling articles have now shown precisely why Tunisia was different -- its robust middle class, its highly educated population, its relatively small size, its ties to Europe through labor migration and remittances, its vulnerability to the global financial crisis, its particularly censored media, its relatively small and under-nurtured military, its relative insignificance to U.S. strategic interests. But those aren't the only reasons to doubt that the Tunisian model can spread.

Another argument for skepticism is authoritarian learning. Simply put, most Arab regimes are quick studies when it comes to their own survival, and quickly adapt when challenged. Unlike tightly controlled Tunisia, states such as Egypt and Jordan have been grappling with protests movements for going on a decade now and have an all-too-rich experience with how to repress, divide, and defeat the new protest movements. Yesterday's massive demonstrations in Cairo may have shocked everyone -- outsiders, Egypt's government, even the protestors -- but in a country which has been rocked by pro-Palestine and anti-Iraq war protests, the Kefaya movement, the April 6 movement, the judges and lawyers protests, and massive labor unrest, the difference is in scale, not type. The same is true across many of the Arab countries which have struggled with restive societies over the last decade.

Dictators learn from each other, not just from the past. The Arab Summit last week displayed this very clearly. Every Arab leader is on red alert at the moment, determined not to repeat Ben Ali's mistakes. They are frantically offering concessions on economic issues, reversing price rises and increasing subsidies. And of course they are ramping up the repressive apparatus, on the streets and online, to try to stop any snowballs from rolling before they get too big. The lesson most seem to have learned is not "be more democratic," it is "be tougher." No Arab leader seems likely to be taken by surprise, or to disregard the early signs of trouble. The success of Egypt's protestors yesterday doesn't mean that they won't be violently crushed today.

And then, of course, there's the international context. Where Tunisia may be relatively insignificant to the great international strategic issues in the region -- Israel, Iran, Iraq, oil -- other potential dominoes have a greater claim on the support of the world's Realists. These authoritarian regimes are the foundation of the America-led regional order. For all the U.S. talk about democracy promotion, the goal has always been to strengthen and legitimize these allies -- to prevent, not to nurture, the kind of popular mobilization exploding today. It's not the least bit surprising that the Washington Post, which has obsessively focused on democracy in Egypt, today finds itself deeply worried by instability there and the strength of Islamists.

Finally, most of the regimes seem to retain the foundations of their overt strength. Oil prices are tolerably high, security services loyal, elections thoroughly manipulated, Islamists repressed, international support strong. In short, there are plenty of reasons to see Tunisia as a one-off.

And yet… it doesn't feel that way. The scenes in Cairo yesterday stand as a sharp rebuke to any analytical certainty. The Egyptian regime was fully prepared, its security forces on alert and deployed, the internet disrupted and al-Jazeera largely off the table… and yet tens of thousands of people still poured into the streets and put together one of the largest demonstrations in contemporary Egyptian history.

Tunisia has manifestly inspired people across the region and galvanized their willingness to take risks to push for change, even without any clear leadership from political parties, Islamist movements, or even civil society. The Tunisian example has offered the possibility of success, and models for sustained action by a decentralized network, after a long and dispiriting period of authoritarian retrenchment. Al-Jazeera and the new media have played their role in reshaping political opportunities and narratives, but it is people who have seized those opportunities. And the core weaknesses of these Arab states --- fierce but feeble, as Nazih Ayubi might have said -- have been exposed. They have massively failed to meet the needs of their people, with awesome problems of unemployment, inflation, youth frustration and inequality combined with the near-complete absence of viable formal political institutions.

The protests have been completely outside of and in opposition to any formal political institutions, and are not channeled through any organized political parties which might push for direct political incorporation. Even if other regimes should fall, it is far too soon therefore to say that they will lead to democracy -- in the rest of the region, just as in Tunisia. We should all be thinking carefully, as Steve Heydemann usefully reminds us, about which scenarios might play out and how transitions to democracy might be crafted from this new protest wave.

Two final points. First, we must not allow fears of Islamists to short-circuit support for such transitions. Already, scare-mongering over the potential for Islamist takeovers has become a major, even dominant theme of Western and Arab official discussions of Tunisia --- and that, in a country where the primary Islamist party al-Nahda was long ago crushed and its leaders exiled. I've long expected that if Egypt got the democratic change which so many in Washington talk about, there would be a rapid and intense backlash as the still powerful Muslim Brotherhood necessarily played a major role and as popular opposition to the Mubarak government's foreign policy jeopardized American and Israeli interests. I'm hoping to be proven wrong.

Second, I think that the Obama administration has handled the last month surprisingly well. It has been absolutely right to resist trying to claim credit for change in Tunisia or to put a "Made in America" stamp on something which manifestly was not. I suspect that there was more of a role behind the scenes in shaping the Ben Ali endgame than is now known. The State Department and the White House have issued a series of strong statements in support of the Tunisian people, including in last night's State of the Union, and last night the White House took a very well-crafted position on Egypt: "We support the universal rights of the Egyptian people, including the rights to freedom of expression, association and assembly. The Egyptian government has an important opportunity to be responsive to the aspirations of the Egyptian people, and pursue political, economic and social reforms that can improve their lives and help Egypt prosper. The United States is committed to working with Egypt and the Egyptian people to advance these goals."

Obama was right in the past to not give in to the temptation to make empty declarations on Egyptian or Arab democracy which would not be met, thereby proving the U.S. either hypocritical or impotent. And the administration was right to focus, as I've long suggested, not on "democracy" but on civil society, economic opportunity, and the "Bill of Rights" freedoms (of speech and of assembly, transparency and accountability). But now conditions have changed, the potential for rapid transformations has appeared, and it's time for the administration to seize the moment to make a difference. For all the criticism he's received on democracy promotion, the Obama administration has now already overseen one more peaceful transition away from Arab authoritarian rule than under the entire Bush administration. It's no longer wishful thinking to suggest that it might not be the only one.

Flickr Creative Commons, January 26, 2010